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Groups that rely on the illicit use of violence 
and/or illicit sources of wealth to pursue 
their goals plague many countries. However, 
they tend to play a disproportionate role 
in post-confl ict settings where wartime 
networks or networks forged during the 
transition from war to peace undermine 
the institution-building efforts necessary 
for democratic stability and development. 
To improve actors’ understanding of this 
problem and to begin devising remedies, the 
Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Studies (CSRS) held a workshop entitled 
“Cleaning House: Confronting Illicit Power 
Structures in Post-Confl ict Settings” in 
Monterey, CA, from November 4-7, 2007. 
More than 40 panelists and participants 
from nongovernmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, 
government civilian agencies, the armed 
forces, thinktanks, and academic institutions 
met to review a proposed framework for 
analyzing the propensities, capacities, and 
vulnerabilities of illicit power structures 
and to assess ways in which the framework 
might guide practitioner responses to this 
global challenge. The workshop, which built 
on a number of conferences on the illicit 
power structure framework sponsored by 
the United States Agency for International 
Development, is part of a CSRS series of 
events addressing the negative impact of 
corruption and institution building in 
post-confl ict settings.
This report represents the author’s 
interpretations of the workshop’s primary 
fi ndings. Participants did not formally endorse 
the list of fi ndings or recommendations 
identifi ed in the report.
About This Event
The Center for Stabilization 
and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) is a teaching institute 
which develops and hosts 
educational programs for stabilization 
and reconstruction practitioners operating 
around the globe. Established by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 2004 through 
the vision and congressional support of 
Congressman Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS 
creates a wide array of programs to foster 
dialogue among practitioners, as well as help 
them develop new strategies and refi ne best 
practices to improve the effectiveness of 
their important global work.
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes 
to the university’s research and graduate 
degree programs. For more information 
about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, 
please visit www.nps.edu/csrs. 
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Although illicit power structures threaten many fragile states, stabilization and 
reconstruction actors have yet to take a coordinated, strategic approach towards 
combating them. Workshop participants sought to refi ne analytical frameworks 
to deepen actors’ understanding of these groups and to create new strategies for 
minimizing their negative effects on the democratic state-building process. 
Executive Summary
In recent years, the activities of illicit power 
structures (IPS) have reached stability-
threatening proportions in a large number 
of war-torn states, forcing the issue onto 
the post-confl ict agenda in cases as diverse 
as Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone. Although IPS plague many countries, 
they tend to play a disproportionate role 
in post-confl ict settings where wartime 
networks or networks forged during 
the transition from war to peace take 
advantage of illicit sources of wealth, 
including the diversion of state resources, 
and/or an illicit reliance on violence to 
pursue their goals. Whether located inside 
or outside of fragile states, these actors 
undermine states’ ability to provide security 
for their citizens, the rule of law, and the 
corruption-free institutions needed for 
effective democratic governance. 
To date, neither development planners, 
anti-corruption specialists, nor international 
actors involved in stabilization and 
reconstruction (S&R) work have taken a 
coordinated, strategic approach towards 
combating IPS and their negative effects 
on institution building in post-confl ict 
settings. Most state-building programs 
focus predictably on institutional capacity 
building, while anti-corruption programs 
focus on increasing the transparency of a 
country’s institutions or strengthening the 
ability of groups in civil society to monitor 
corruption. Less attention is paid to the 
interests and power of the “dark networks” 
of key players inside and outside of the 
government, corrupting and subverting the 
processes of reconstruction, stabilization, 
and state building. Conversely, while 
confl ict analysts have long been concerned 
with power structures that may subvert 
the peace process (i.e., spoilers), they tend 
to discount the illicit economic activities 
in which these groups are engaged and the 
implications of co-opting such groups for 
future governability and development. 
In response, both the S&R and 
development communities have begun 
to pay increasing attention to the nexus 
of IPS with corruption, confl ict, and 
peace-building.1 As a contribution to this 
ongoing effort, the Center for Stabilization 
and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at 
the Naval Postgraduate School hosted 
a workshop entitled “Cleaning House: 
Confronting Illicit Power Structures in 









Workshop participants used 
the USAID framework, 
case studies, and ﬁ eld 
experiences to shape 
discussions, evaluate the 
effectiveness of actors’ 
responses to IPS, and 
create cross-community 
networks they could 
leverage in the ﬁ eld.
X  Y Z [
Made key revisions to 
the USAID framework. 
Participants’ revised 
framework focuses 




resources of IPS to 




This tool serves 
as a starting point 
for identifying and 
developing more 
effective strategies 
and tactics to 
counter IPS’ 
subversive impacts.
Used the five prisms 
to identify the kind of 
information needed 
to analyze IPS and 
suggested ways this 
data could be obtained. 
The next step in the 
project would be to 
formalize a checklist of 
questions that can be 
used by field operators 
and to institutionalize 
interagency mechanisms
for developing and 
sharing this knowledge.
Began to devise 
responses to IPS that 
used the leverage 
provided by each of 
the analytical prisms. 
Using their own field 
experiences and case 
studies presented at the 
workshop, participants 
were able to identify 
and evaluate a number 
of responses designed 
to reduce the harmful 
effects of IPS, by either 
making them licit or 
marginalizing them. 
The next phase of the 
IPS project must look 
systematically at the 
effectiveness of previous 
efforts to counter IPS to 
identify relevant lessons. 
Forged cross-
community networks 
of individuals with a 
common language 
for diagnosing and 
addressing the 
challenges posed 
by IPS. Workshop 
participants articulated 





to implement it. 
from November 4-7, 2007. CSRS events 
convene members of the four primary 
communities involved in S&R work 
around the globe: intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), government 
civilian agencies, and the armed forces to 
explore timely, relevant issues; brainstorm 
new strategies; learn best practices; and 
network with peers. The November 2007 
workshop gathered 42 participants from 
these communities and academia. 
On the fi rst day, workshop participants 
identifi ed necessary modifi cations to the 
analytical IPS framework that had been 
developed at a series of United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) 
workshops over the preceding year. On 
the second day, subject matter experts 
applied the framework to a number of case 
studies: the Communist Party of Nepal, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda (LRA), 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia (FARC) and paramilitaries 
of Colombia, warlords of Afghanistan, 
and fi ve IPS in Mindanao. On the third 
day, participants broke into small groups 
to examine the usefulness of the revised 
framework for informing actors’ responses 
to IPS. (See graphic above for a synopsis of 
participant accomplishments.) 
The following fi ndings and recommendations 
emerged from the workshop: 
IPS are defi ned as groups or networks 
whose reliance on violence or illicit 
economic activities strikes at the heart of 
the state-building project. (See graphic 
on page 3.) This revised defi nition builds 
on the now widely accepted defi nition of 
non-state armed groups as organizations 
that challenge the state’s core function of 
monopolizing the use of force. It casts a 
wider net by including criminal networks 
whose use of violence may not rise to the 
level of a general and fundamental threat 
to human security, but whose reliance on 
corruption and penetration of the state 
hollows out those institutions and perverts 
their very essence. While IPS are present in a 
wide range of settings, they are particularly 
prevalent in post-confl ict settings where 
criminalized networks that originally 
funded confl ict now enjoy privileged access 
to the state and political actors. In many 
cases, criminal networks proliferate as 
demobilized combatants channel their skills 
and networks to new ends. 
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Workshop participants 
  defined illicit power structures 
as entities that:
X  Challenge the state’s core function of providing a monopoly on the use of force; and/or 
Y  Engage in criminal economic activities; and
Z  Threaten the state’s ability to govern effectively.
Deﬁ ning IPS
IPS are entities that: (1) challenge the state’s 
core function of providing a monopoly on the 
use of force; and/or (2) engage in criminal 
economic activities; and (3) threaten the state’s 
ability to govern effectively.2 This deﬁ nition 
includes non-state armed groups (NSAGs) but 
also draws attention to actors typically excluded, 
or at least marginalized, from that literature. 
This includes criminal networks whose use of 
violence may not rise to the level of “a general 
and fundamental threat to human security” but 
whose reliance on corruption and/or penetration 
of the state hollows out those institutions and 
perverts their very essence. It also highlights the 
fact that IPS often are located within the state 
and are not limited to armed groups in society. 
However, all IPS share a common trait: their 
illicit activities strike at the heart of the state-
building enterprise. 
Given the importance of labels and deﬁ nitions 
in shaping responses to problems, it is essential 
to add a number of caveats. Including criminals, 
corrupt networks, and non-state armed groups 
under the rubric of IPS is not meant to deny 
potentially important differences between them.3 
In fact, the analytical prisms that comprise the 
framework highlight these differences where 
they exist. However, by including all of these 
entities under one rubric, the IPS framework 
highlights the links between groups at any 
given point in time, as well as any shifts that 
may occur as groups move from one category 
to another over time. It also suggests that the 
standard approaches typically employed against 
each set of actors might beneﬁ t from a cross-
fertilization of ideas: for example, those who 
deal with organized crime could beneﬁ t from the 
perspectives of those who typically face non-
state armed groups and vice versa. 
Finally, labeling the groups as “illicit” is not 
meant to imply that law enforcement is the 
only or even the primary mode of addressing 
IPS. Nor is it to deny the fact that some IPS 
may be regarded as legitimate by groups in 
society, a factor which is taken into account in 
the framework under the relationships prism. 
It does highlight the fact, however, that the 
behavior of IPS is illicit from the perspective of 
the democratic state-building project endorsed 
by the international community.
The revised framework 
provides a more robust 
tool for analyzing the 
propensities, capacities, 
and vulnerabilities of 
different types of IPS.
Workshop participants 
revised the USAID 
framework for analyzing 
IPS to include five prisms 
that illuminate these 
groups’ propensities 
and capacities. 
The five prisms are:
X  Worldview 
Y  Motivations 
Z  Resources[  Relationships \  Internal Structures
Executive Summary4
The fi ve prisms employed in the framework 
help practitioners analyze the nature and 
level of the challenges IPS pose to the 
state-building project by uncovering the 
groups’ propensities and capacities. (See 
graphic on page 5.) They also help actors 
shape appropriate responses by identifying 
potential vulnerabilities and suggesting how 
IPS will react to any given intervention.  
The fi ve prisms are described below:
•  Worldview — This prism examines 
the discourse and behavior of an IPS 
to determine the extent to which a 
group is “absolutist” in its rejection of 
a democratic, rule-based system or is 
“reconcilable” (i.e., willing to abide by the 
rules of such a system). The IPS’ placement 
on this spectrum will help the international 
community decide whether to pursue a 
strategy of marginalization or engagement 
at any given point in time. It also serves as 
a metric of effectiveness since one objective 
of policy interventions is to move the IPS 
along the spectrum from absolutist to 
reconcilable; both marginalization and 
engagement strategies might contribute 
to this goal. While actors’ examination of 
an IPS’ worldview has most commonly 
been used to ascertain if a non-state armed 
group is amenable to peace talks, it can 
also be used to accomplish a variety of 
other objectives, including determining 
ways to garner the adherence of non-state 
armed groups to human rights standards 
or decreasing the level of violence 
employed by criminal gangs. 
•  Motivations — This prism builds on 
the rich literature inspired by the debate 
over whether confl ict in resource-
rich environments is fueled by loot-
seeking or justice-seeking motivations. 
However, it moves beyond the greed or 
grievance dichotomy to acknowledge the 
increasing prevalence of hybrid actors 
and the complex mix of interests within 
organizations, even those that seem to 
have a singular motive. Understanding this 
mix of motives is essential if practitioners 
are to craft an effective agenda for 
peace negotiations; tailor disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
strategies to the varying interests of 
leaders, mid-level commanders, and rank-
and-fi le soldiers; and address the root 
causes of confl ict or crime. 
•  Resources — Financial resources 
are key to the operation of an IPS, 
Mr. Matthew Vaccaro, 
Center for Stabilization 
and Reconstruction 




regardless of the group’s motive, and 
thus efforts to deprive groups of their 
funding have been well-developed. In 
this age of globalization, IPS often boast 
diversifi ed portfolios of income, ranging 
from criminal activities to licit trade to 
donations from diaspora groups to state 
sponsors. Consequently, the international 
community has implemented a wide range 
of control regimes with varying degrees 
of success. The success of such efforts 
depends in part on understanding the 
other funding options open to a given 
IPS and the broader relationships within 
which resource exchanges take place. 
•  Relationships — Although the violence 
and economic predation of IPS are 
considered illicit from the perspective 
of the democratic state-building project, 
the framework does not presume that 
all groups in society share this view. 
This prism seeks to understand the 
mix of coercive, material, and social 
or ideological ties that bind the IPS to 
other key actors, including the general 
population, business, politicians, the 
state, and external actors. Understanding 
the relationship between IPS and the 
population is important to combat both 
traditional insurgents that focus on 
cultivating popular support, as well as 
more predatory rebel groups and criminal 
organizations that may both abuse and 
protect the population. In post-confl ict 
settings particularly, the line between 
violent gangs and criminal groups and 
politicians and the state is increasingly 
blurred. Attention needs to be paid to 
all of these critical relationships. Finally, 
most illicit actors benefi t greatly from 
transnational ties that facilitate their 
violence or criminal activity. Hence, these 
ties most be studied and combated. 
•  Internal Structure — Law enforcement 
and military analysts have long 
acknowledged the different capabilities and 
vulnerabilities of hierarchical organizations 
and networks. This prism builds on 
these insights, focusing on the ways in 
which IPS are organized for command 
and control and the performance of key 
activities. Understanding these elements 
helps actors create guidelines for strategies 
seeking to disarticulate IPS. In addition, 
this issue is becoming increasingly relevant 
for engagement strategies, ranging from 
human rights accords to peace talks to 
DDR programs.
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Participants noted the value of using 
diverse perspectives and expertise to 
analyze IPS. Actors can gain a deep cultural 
understanding of the IPS and its insertion 
into the society and polity by consulting 
anthropologists and other experts with a 
long history of studying the group, as well 
as by conducting interviews with active 
group members, demobilized combatants, 
and internally displaced persons. Assessment 
teams comprised of members from a range 
of governmental organizations, IGOs, and 
NGOs could help provide the diversity 
of perspectives and expertise needed for 
accurate analysis. They also could contribute 
to developing a shared assessment of a 
given IPS or at least creating a shared 
language that could facilitate development of 
comprehensive and coordinated approaches 
to the problem. 
While analysts have devoted a good deal 
of time to examining the characteristics 
of IPS, less attention has been paid to 
the implications of these features on 
selecting and implementing strategies that 
successfully mitigate the negative effects of 
IPS on democratic state-building. Workshop 
participants stressed the importance of an IPS’ 
worldview in shaping practitioners’ decisions 
on whether to engage or marginalize a given 
group and noted how differences in the nature 
of IPS shape the effectiveness of various 
strategies. For example, “kingpin” strategies 
targeting an organization’s leadership 
will meet with varying degrees of success 
depending on whether the organization has 
a highly centralized charismatic leadership 
structure, a hierarchical structure with a more 
bureaucratic form of leadership, or a network 
form. Similarly, efforts targeting resources 
may be more effective against greed-based 
organizations than ideological groups. While 
the ultimate success of interventions depends 
on a wide range of factors, inattention to 
IPS type has contributed to past failures 
and therefore merits additional study and 
consideration by policymakers.
Finally, workshop participants noted that 
efforts to marginalize or engage groups 
involve trade-offs and may even be counter-
productive. An arms embargo, for example, 
may do little to weaken a group and may 
instead entrench criminal elements within 
political structures, as was the case in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. In many cases, the 
peace process may result in non-state armed 
groups laying down their weapons but 
continuing to rely on illicit wealth and veiled 
threats of violence to pervert the resulting 
peace. Creative thinking is needed to avoid 
these trade-offs. While the transformation of 
“peace spoilers” into “governance spoilers” 
may in some cases be unavoidable, the 
intractable problems posed by warlords who 
have not made the transition to “peacelords” 
led workshop participants to explore 
innovative ways in which conditionality, 
broadly conceived, might be incorporated 
into engagement strategies. 
This report provides an overview of 
the revised framework that workshop 
participants produced and explores its 
implications for actors seeking to design an 
effective response to IPS. It begins with a 
defi nition of IPS and then discusses each of 
the fi ve prisms used for analysis. The third 
section highlights the kind of information 
that needs to be collected in the fi eld to 
understand IPS better, while the fourth 
reviews the implications of the prisms 
for devising responses to IPS. A fi fth and 
concluding section offers recommendations 
for the further development of efforts to 
address IPS.••
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Pictured from left to right: IPS project coordinator Mr. Michael Miklaucic, 
US Agency for International Development; Lieutenant Colonel Apollinaire 
Ndayimirije, African Union Mission in Sudan; and workshop facilitator and 
report author Ms. Jeanne Giraldo, Naval Postgraduate School.
Workshop participants revised the IPS framework to develop a more nuanced 
view of IPS, their propensities, capacities, and critical vulnerabilities to identify 
leverage points for policy interventions. 
Prisms of Analysis
Workshop participants made important 
changes to the IPS framework that had 
been developed and discussed at previous 
conferences sponsored by USAID. The 
revised framework that emerged by the end 
of the three days examines IPS through fi ve 
successive analytic prisms designed to give 
fi eld operators a progressively more detailed 
and multidimensional understanding of IPS. 
The fi ve prisms are worldview, motivations, 
resources, relationships, and internal 
structure.4 Each prism offers insight into the 
level and nature of the challenges posed by 
IPS, providing an accurate diagnosis that is 
necessary for policy making. 
This section describes how each prism 
contributes to understanding the 
propensities, vulnerabilities, and capacities 
of IPS. A subsequent section (“Devising 
Responses to IPS”) more fully addresses the 
implications of each prism for designing 
effective interventions.
A. Worldview
The original USAID framework included an 
important but somewhat narrow defi nition 
of an IPS worldview as the “endstate” 
desired by an organization: “the view IPS 
leaders have of the world and their desired 
confi guration of the world, as well as their 
organization’s place in that world.”5 Does 
the IPS desire a democracy in which the 
group can participate, a people’s republic 
in which it is the single party that rules, 
or the continuation of a confl ict situation 
that allows the pursuit of profi table but 
illegal activities? Arguably, the archetypal 
contemporary determination with respect 
to worldview is the acceptance of a rule-
based system of democratic states as the 
fundamental organizing principle for the 
global political architecture. IPS that can 
be coaxed to participate within such a 
system are judged to be “non-absolutist” or 
“reconcilable,” while those that cannot are 
referred to as “absolutist.” 
Workshop participants revised this prism in 
a number of signifi cant ways. Instead of a 
dichotomy, they agreed that groups should 
be placed along a continuum, with analysts 
assessing the extent to which an IPS’ 
goals and behavior are reconcilable with 
a rule-based democratic state. A central 
goal of policy interventions would be to 
move IPS along this continuum. Second, 
7
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participants stressed the importance of 
constantly reassessing the label assigned 
to an IPS, to see if policy interventions 
or other forces have moved the IPS along 
the continuum. Third, it is possible that 
leadership factions within the IPS may have 
different worldviews (with exiled political 
leadership, for example, sometimes taking 
a more softline approach than the military 
leadership actively engaged in the confl ict).
In addition to reviewing an IPS’ internal 
and external discourse to determine its 
goals, workshop participants recommended 
examining a range of IPS behaviors as 
indicators of the group’s worldview. The 
more that an IPS’ behaviors deviate from 
those judged acceptable in democratic, rule-
based states, the closer the IPS should be 
placed to the absolutist end of the spectrum. 
In the case of Afghanistan, warlords 
who saw themselves as exempt from the 
authority of the central state (the internal 
discourse criterion), who engaged in acts 
of corruption that exceeded culturally 
acceptable limits, and who maintained their 
armed networks, were deemed absolutist.6 
To offer another example, all drug 
traffi ckers would be considered IPS, but 
those who engage in extensive bribery of 
public offi cials and carry out campaigns of 
violence to intimidate the citizenry and state 
offi cials would be closer to the absolutist 
end of the spectrum than other traffi cking 
groups that engaged in their illicit activity 
without violence or corruption.
Finally, the workshop participants 
tentatively endorsed a somewhat broader, 
more anthropological conception of an 
IPS’ worldview than that espoused in the 
original framework. From this perspective, 
the prism should examine not just the 
group’s desired endstate; rather, it should 
develop “a deeper knowing, an awareness 
of [the IPS’] experiences and perceptions, 
an understanding of their logic or way 
of reasoning, and some ability to predict 
or explain what they do.”7 For example, 
workshop participants noted that leaders 
of IPS that have spent 20 or 40 years in 
the countryside fi ghting, as is the case 
with the LRA in Uganda and the FARC in 
Colombia, are likely to carry out cost-benefi t 
calculations that are rational based on 
their experience but may be different from 
what an outside observer would expect. In 
particular, such groups are likely to have 
longer time horizons and are less susceptible 
to being pressured in negotiations. 
Above: Ms. Katherine Liesegang, US Agency for International Development 
and Mr. William Stuebner, ACDI/VOCA.
Right: Colonel Joe Cabell, US Marine Corps; Ms. Phyllis Dininio, Ofﬁ ce of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, US Department of State; 
and Mr. Kai Stabell, United Nations Development Programme.
Vice Admiral Daniel Oliver 
(Ret.), President of the 
Naval Postgraduate School, 
welcomes participants to 
the workshop. 
This broader notion of worldview is 
essential not only for interpreting IPS 
behavior but also for understanding how 
and why the endstate desired by an IPS may 
change over time and consequently, how 
policy interventions can help move groups 
along the continuum from absolutist to 
reconcilable. For non-state armed groups, 
the turning point is often linked to the 
creation of a “mutually hurting stalemate”:
When the parties ﬁ nd themselves 
locked in a conﬂ ict from which they 
cannot escalate to victory and this 
deadlock is painful to both of them 
(although not necessarily in equal 
degree or for the same reasons), they 
seek an alternative policy or Way Out.8 
This stalemate cannot be determined 
objectively, but rather depends on the 
perceptions of the warring parties. An IPS’ 
worldview includes such factors as its level 
of trust in the state, perceptions about 
acceptable costs and benefi ts, expectations 
of the likelihood of success, and its time 
horizons — knowledge of which would 
facilitate the work of a peace mediator, as 
well as prior efforts of actors to create the 
mutually hurting stalemate that might lead 
to peace talks. The FARC, for example, 
deeply distrusts the government, views 
time as an unlimited strategic resource, and 
reacts more sanguinely to setbacks than an 
organization with greater expectations of 
victory in the short run — all factors which 
militate against a peaceful resolution to the 
confl ict in the short run.9 
In short, an understanding of an IPS’ 
worldview is key to determining whether 
and how its behavior may be infl uenced. 
These insights would be useful for a wide 
range of initiatives, from engaging non-
state armed groups in peace talks to efforts 
to transform warlords into peacelords to 
facilitating truces between gangs.10
B. Motivations – Creed, Need, 
Greed or Other?
With the end of the Cold War and 
superpower funding of intrastate confl ict, 
analysts shifted their attention to the role 
of natural resources in fueling civil war. The 
work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffl er on 
the prevalence of “loot seeking” in intra-
state confl ict particularly resonated with 
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observers of countries where battles for 
control over oil, diamonds, or the drug 
trade was a more central feature of confl ict 
than military victories and where armed 
groups engaged in predatory behavior 
toward groups in society that insurgents 
had typically tried to woo. However, 
the argument that “greed” was the main 
motivator of confl ict soon engendered a 
signifi cant counter-literature arguing that 
“need” (political or economic grievances) 
and “creed” (generalized belief or identify 
feelings) remain critical motivating factors 
in civil war. 
Today the debate over the competing 
roles of “greed,” “need,” and “creed” in 
fueling internal confl ict appears to have 
dissipated somewhat as further study and 
examination has produced a more nuanced 
understanding of IPS. While access to 
resources is seen as an important factor 
making confl ict feasible, the onset of 
hostilities usually has its basis in grievance. 
In settings where resources are readily 
available, confl icts tend to last longer, 
whether they are motivated by greed or 
grievance. In the former case, the warring 
parties often profi t economically from 
ongoing confl ict; in the latter case, the 
deep pockets of armed actors give them 
the fi nancial wherewithal to wait out 
strategic setbacks and create reasonable 
expectations of future successes. It is also 
widely accepted that motivations are 
subject to change over time, with confl icts 
originating from grievance often evolving 
into confl icts over access to and profi t 
from resources. In short, trying to attribute 
motivation exclusively to greed, creed, or 
need is fruitless, while stating that material 
considerations play a role in all political 
confl ict is banal. Instead, it is the interplay 
between greed, creed, and need that is of 
causal interest.11 
The revised IPS framework sought to 
incorporate the notion of the interplay of 
motives in a number of ways.12 First, it took 
a disaggregated look at IPS membership to 
determine if the top leadership, mid-level 
commanders, and rank-and-fi le members 
had different motives. Second, the notion of 
“interplay” was interpreted to recognize that 
groups or individuals may have secondary 
motivations which may come to the fore 
under changing circumstances or pressure 
from outside actors. For this reason, rank 
ordering the importance of motivations for 
different groups within the organization is 
Prisms of Analysis10
From left to right: 
Mr. William Stuebner 
and Lieutenant 
Salomon Camez, Naval 
Postgraduate School 
and Navy of Mexico. 
important. Third and relatedly, there is a 
temporal component to motivations that 
requires analysis. In terms of individuals, the 
motives for joining an organization, staying 
in it, and deciding to leave it may all differ. 
Overall, this more nuanced approach to 
identifying motives helped avoid the fruitless 
debates that tend to occur when analysts are 
required to assign a single, reductive motive 
to a group. In particular, the workshop 
discussion of motives was most useful when 
participants had a particular policy goal or 
program in mind; this goal dictated whose 
interests needed to be understood and why. 
In the case of DDR programs, for example, 
participants stressed the utility of identifying 
the varying motives and interests of IPS 
leadership, mid-level leaders, and rank-and-
fi le followers and tailoring programs for 
each group that addressed these needs. In 
the case of peace processes, practitioners 
with experience in Africa highlighted the 
importance of understanding the greed-
based agendas of IPS leaders for shaping 
successful peace talks. 
During the discussion of DDR, workshop 
participants raised the question of whether 
the “need, creed, and greed” trilogy 
exhausted the range of motives of IPS 
members or if this should be expanded to 
include, inter alia, the basic “livelihood” 
needs of IPS members. Some participants 
thought this constituted a new, fourth 
motivation to be added to the list of “greed, 
creed, or need,” whereas others thought 
it could be subsumed under one of these 
existing categories, although there was 
disagreement about which category. Some 
participants referred to a livelihood need 
as a “greed”-based motive since it involves 
the pursuit of self-interest, whereas others 
interpreted it more charitably as a basic 
“need.” Neither of these approaches, 
however, comports with existing usage of 
the greed and need labels in the literature. 
“Greed” is typically used to evoke personal 
self-enrichment that goes beyond fulfi lling 
basic livelihood needs, whereas “need” 
refers to collective political and economic 
grievances. More importantly, since 
livelihood concerns transcend the creed, 
need, and greed categories — during peace 
talks, all group members are concerned 
about their future livelihood regardless of 
the kind of IPS to which they belong — it 
would be inaccurate to include livelihoods 
under only one of these labels. In short, 
livelihood refers to the interests and motives 
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of individuals; it will include the survival 
needs of individuals but is also likely to 
refer to the status and power demands that 
must be satisfi ed for each individual to lay 
down his or her arms. Where greed was a 
motivating factor, these latter demands are 
likely to be greater than where individuals 
fought for collective goals. 
One of the biggest challenges posed by 
this prism is determining what constitutes 
evidence of greed-based motives. Since at 
least the 1990s, it has become increasingly 
common for NSAGs to rely on criminal 
activities to self-fund their activities, so this 
clearly cannot be an indicator of motive. 
Indeed, the literature is careful to note that 
participation in illicit economic activities 
(often referred to as “economic motivations”) 
can be driven by the desire for personal 
enrichment (greed), the need for survival in 
the case of individuals (livelihood), or as a 
means to fund a grievance-based war effort 
(whether need or creed). It is important to 
note that an IPS’ obsession with pursuing 
resources or embracing tactics or strategies 
that seem from the outside to be irrational 
or ineffective ways of accomplishing the 
IPS’ stated goals are not reliable indicators 
of greed as a primary motive. Instead, these 
decisions are just as likely to be the product 
of a process of militarization in which leaders 
and members may lose touch with their 
constituents and sacrifi ce the ultimate goals of 
the organization on the altar of short-sighted 
metrics of effectiveness. In Colombia, for 
example, the FARC has become increasingly 
willing to pay a high political cost for military 
victories with minor payoffs.13 Arguably, 
this shift has occurred not because greed has 
displaced politics within the organization, 
but rather because leaders with military 
backgrounds and experience became 
ascendant with the military victories and 
increased operations tempo of the mid- to late 
1990s. As a consequence, a military logic has 
come to predominate. 
Despite these caveats, workshop 
participants offered some suggestions 
for discerning motives. Indicators of 
greed-based motives might be a lavish 
lifestyle enjoyed by IPS members and/or 
leadership and a lack of attention within 
the organization to social or political 
indoctrination. Collusion with armed 
rivals to pursue profi t-generating activities 
(e.g., cross-ethnic cooperation in criminal 
enterprises in Bosnia, the phenomenon 
of “sobels” in Africa, paramilitary and 
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FARC collaboration in the drug trade 
in some parts of Colombia, Northern 
Alliance warlord sales of weaponry to the 
Taliban) have all been cited as a sign of the 
dominance of the greed motive. Conversely, 
if the IPS engages in high-cost activities 
unrelated to its economic pursuits, like 
the political education of new recruits 
or the employment of stringent selection 
criteria when recruiting members, one 
might conclude it is primarily motivated 
by creed or need. Similarly, if rank-and-fi le 
members do not receive a salary and are 
not allowed to loot as a means to garner 
compensation, one can assume that they 
are not motivated by greed.
C. Resources 
The process of globalization of the 1990s 
— and with it an increase in the movement 
of people, goods, and money across borders 
— opened up new possibilities for income 
generation by IPS. NSAGs, in particular, 
were increasingly able to fund their own 
operations, drawing on a range of legal and 
illegal activities. While IPS are present in a 
wide range of settings, they are particularly 
prevalent in post-confl ict settings where 
criminalized networks that originally 
funded confl ict now enjoy privileged access 
to the state and to combatants-turned-
politicians. In many cases, crime may 
increase as demobilized combatants channel 
their skills and networks to criminal ends. 
In other cases, the military and police may 
be complicit in economic predation, either 
as a legacy of the confl ict or in response to 
reductions in defense spending that might 
accompany peace. 
This prism examines the material resources, 
such as money, weapons, and space, that 
are alternately the end or means of IPS 
activities.14 From where, and to what extent, 
does the IPS get its fi nancial resources, be 
they remittances from a global diaspora, state 
sponsorships, revenues from legal as well as 
illegal commerce, the exploitation of natural 
resources, the corrupt diversion of public 
funds, or other criminal activities? How easily 
can an IPS replace a loss of one resource with 
another? From what sources and by what 
means does it obtain its weaponry? How does 
it use geography or other elements of space 
(e.g., slum areas, lawless borderlands, safe 
havens) to carry out its activities and how 
important is this resource? 
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The use of space is usually the easiest 
for outside observers to assess, though 
not necessarily to combat. Given the 
varied sources of funding and weaponry 
available and the diffi culty of tracking 
fi nancial and arms fl ows across borders, it 
may be diffi cult to gain a comprehensive 
overview of these resources, despite an 
increased attention to these matters in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001.15 Similarly, 
the embedded networks of corruption 
that plague the state in post-corruption 
settings are often diffi cult to document.
D. Relationships
The fourth prism in the framework calls 
attention to the IPS’ relationships with other 
actors, both inside and outside its country 
of operation.16 Within a country, one of the 
most signifi cant relationships to examine 
is that between the IPS and the general 
population, which might be broken down 
into subsectors (e.g., rural, urban, business, 
areas of long-standing versus new activity). 
This process would include examining the 
modes of recruitment employed by IPS as 
well as the material and moral support 
provided by key groups. Given the critical 
resources controlled by politicians, the state, 
and other rival or partner IPS, relationships 
with these actors also merit special attention. 
Relationships with external actors, such 
as the diaspora community, neighboring 
states, cross-border population groups, and 
international business, have all received 
attention in the literature on NSAGs and 
are relevant more broadly for IPS. A focus 
on the importance of cross-national ties has 
long been a mainstay of the literature on 
transnational crime, while studies of regional 
confl ict complexes have become salient in 
the confl ict literature.17 
Although the US government has focused 
on ungoverned spaces as areas in which IPS 
thrive, this prism highlights the fact that 
most of these spaces are indeed governed, 
just not by the state. The relationships and 
exchanges at the heart of the alternative 
governance systems where IPS operate 
and how the IPS fi ts into them are the 
focus of this prism. These systems need to 
be understood on their own terms rather 
than defi ned primarily by what they are 
not (i.e., areas not governed by the rule of 
law). Toward this end, the prism analyzes 
Above: Participants discussed the need to examine the full range of 
relationships IPS possess and how they sustain IPS and shape their behavior. 
At right: Mr. Matthew Durkin, Naval Air Systems Command, US Navy (right) 
talks with Mr. Cliff Aims, US Joint Forces Command.
the extent to which the IPS exercises its 
power over others through coercion, 
material inducements, and/or legitimacy 
(e.g., religious, tribal, ethnic, ideological 
ties, or appeals).18 While IPS may abuse the 
population, they also may provide certain 
services or access to income and livelihood 
in the illicit economy. The prism looks not 
only at what the IPS offers in a relationship, 
but also at what each actor provides to the 
IPS and the relative importance of these 




The fi nal prism in the framework examines 
the internal organization of the IPS, 
including the way in which it is structured 
to carry out its main functions; the manner 
in which decisions are made, implemented 
and monitored; and the training and 
employment of personnel. 
Borrowing from the literature on organized 
crime and terrorism, the framework 
distinguishes between IPS with hierarchical 
and decentralized structures. Each of 
these organizational forms is said to have 
different propensities, operational methods, 
and vulnerabilities.19 
Hierarchical organizations operate on the 
basis of top-down leadership and decision-
making with authority ultimately devolving 
from the top of the leadership pyramid. The 
chain of command is generally clear and 
streamlined. Such organizations often have 
a fairly well-developed division of labor and 
are subject to the bureaucratic phenomenon 
known as “stove-piping.” Only the highest 
ranks are fully appraised of the extent of 
the activities, assets, and interests of the 
organization. At lower levels, personnel 
are often provided information only on a 
“need to know” basis. Yet most elements 
within the organization are aware of the 
structure and are familiar with supervisory, 
subordinate, and lateral elements. 
In contrast, a networked or decentralized 
cell organization is loosely structured and 
can have multiple leaders whose functions 
and responsibilities change depending on 
circumstances. Decision making is usually 
decentralized, encouraging autonomy and 
local initiative and fl exibility. The durability 
of such a structure, however, is dependent 
on the degree to which the cells in the 
network share goals and objectives and a 
similar level of commitment.20 This form 
best describes many criminal organizations 
which rely on shifting, ad hoc alliances to 
carry out their illicit activities and to newly 
formed splinter armed groups in western 
Africa where fl uidity is the norm and 
external relationships may be as important 
as internal in driving behavior. 
The case studies presented in the workshop 
suggested that many IPS do not fall neatly 
into either of these camps; many were close 
to the hierarchical end of the spectrum 
but devolved important decision making 
authorities and functions to regional or 
middle level leaders. Understanding these 
internal relationships and detecting the 
way in which information and resources 
fl ow within the organization is crucial. 
This process involves understanding how 
the different levels of the organization 
— leadership, mid-level leaders, and rank-
and-fi le followers — relate, as well as 
determining how various functions — 
leadership, recruiting, fi nances, operations, 
logistics, technical expertise and training, 
intelligence and counterintelligence — are 
carried out. Similarly, understanding the 
sources of legitimacy of the IPS leadership 
and their decision-making processes, 
whether they are driven by committee 
or a charismatic personality, or operate 
in the transactional mode of a leaderless 
group, has important implications for 
predicting the behavior of IPS as well as 
identifying their vulnerabilities. The level 
of adaptability of the organization and 
its learning capabilities — how resilient 
and fl exible it is — should be examined 
empirically rather than assuming that 
networks are highly adaptable and 
hierarchies are victims of stove-piping. ••
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The Process of Assessing IPS
A key goal of the framework is to create a checklist of questions for assessing IPS (capturing much of what 
was discussed at the workshop) to guide practitioners’ ﬁ eld inquiries. Given the breadth of knowledge and 
the diversity of expertise needed to understand the various prisms, workshop participants believed this 
process should be characterized by the following: 
While undertaking a full analysis of an IPS may seem like a daunting task, practitioners who can 
transcend traditional institutional boundaries will ﬁ nd much of the information easily available. 
In addition, while actors need a passing familiarity with all prisms, in-depth knowledge may not 
be required. As the section “Devising Responses to IPS” demonstrates, the information needed to 
conduct this assessment will vary according to the policy goal.••
•  Interagency cooperation: Workshop 
participants, who came from a diverse range 
of organizations involved in S&R work, were 
acutely aware that actors’ views of an IPS 
are colored by background, training, and 
the organizational tools at their disposal. 
Consequently, assessment teams should be 
composed of representatives from various 
communities to bring all the necessary analytical 
perspectives to the table and contribute to 
developing a shared diagnosis of the challenge 
posed by an IPS in a given situation. While 
this process does not guarantee that actors 
will create a uniﬁ ed, whole-of-government 
response, it may be a useful ﬁ rst step. 
•  Information gathering through interviews: 
Workshop participants stressed the importance 
of conducting intensive interviews to avoid 
relying on the perspectives of the handful of 
individuals in a given country who typically 
interact with the international community. 
The challenge is that these interviews tend 
to be best for determining the opinions of 
different sectors; while this information is 
useful for assessing the political feasibility 
of different responses to IPS, it is less likely 
to yield the kind of solid data necessary for 
analysis. Interviewees must ask about the 
logic or evidence behind the opinions and 
conclusions proffered to ensure that input will 
be useful. In addition, the interview net should 
be cast broadly to capture views of those 
with ﬁ rst-hand contact with IPS, including key 
interlocutors, internally displaced persons, 
and demobilized or captured IPS members. 
•  Reliance on experts: Appropriate analysis 
of the prisms in the framework requires 
more than just the collection of information: 
It presumes a deeper, cultural understanding 
of the group and its place within the society. 
For this reason, workshop participants 
highlighted the importance of consulting 
anthropologists. Workshop presentations by 
subject matter experts from other academic 
disciplines and NGOs also demonstrated 
the value of incorporating the perspectives 
of analysts and practitioners who have 
interacted with and studied the views and 
behavior of a given IPS over time.
•  A measured presentation of ﬁ ndings: 
Given the covert, controversial, and sub-
national nature of many IPS, analysts are 
bound to have limited information on various 
prisms in the framework. The assessment 
team should provide some indication of the 
level of certainty in the information they 
provide on IPS and interpretations thereof. 
In particular, the team should indicate the 
extent to which experts diverge in their 
assessments rather than arriving at an 
artiﬁ cial consensus judgment.
Participants discussed the effectiveness of current policy interventions, which have 
sought to weaken or transform IPS. Transformation efforts include limited efforts 
to modify IPS behavior as well as more far-reaching initiatives to convert armed 
antagonists into peaceful participants in the democratic process. 
Devising Responses to IPS
The fi ve prisms draw attention to the 
propensities, capacities, and vulnerabilities 
of IPS, an accurate diagnosis of which is 
a necessary fi rst step for devising effective 
responses. However, the diagnosis is only 
a starting point. The ultimate goal of the 
framework is to “create a narrative that leads 
to actionable conclusions and analytically 
supports specifi c strategic courses of action 
and tactics to neutralize the subversive impact 
of illicit power structures on democracy 
building efforts and development more 
generally.”21 To accomplish this objective, 
the framework must also review the 
effectiveness of historical strategies and 
tactics for confronting IPS and determine the 
points of entry each prism offers to policy 
makers and practitioners.
Although the IPS framework is designed to 
help actors understand how “soft power” 
approaches (particularly development 
assistance) could complement “hard power” 
strategies for combating IPS, this dichotomy 
did not gain much traction among workshop 
participants.22 Instead, the discussion focused 
on practitioner goals of either weakening IPS 
or transforming them. The former option of 
eliminating or at least marginalizing the IPS 
is typically designed to lessen the ability of 
this group to engage in undesirable behavior. 
The latter option of transforming IPS or 
making them licit is focused on changing IPS 
interest in engaging in illicit behavior. 
The only ways to defeat illicit power 
structures are to make them licit, 
separate them from their power, or 
dismantle their structure. 
  – Workshop Participant
While much attention has been devoted 
to peace processes which convert armed 
antagonists into participants in the 
democratic process, transformation also 
includes more limited efforts to modify the 
behavior of IPS. These processes include 
efforts by the international community to 
secure NSAG compliance with international 
norms of respect for human rights.23 
Amnesty International and other NGOs 
increased their reporting of the human rights 
violations of these groups in the 1980s and 
1990s as part of a “naming and shaming” 
strategy to deter such behavior. More 
recently, the NGO Geneva Call has sought 
the adherence of NSAGs to a protocol 
banning the use of anti-personnel landmines.
In addition, analysts have begun to investigate 
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the more ambitious goal of transforming 
“warlords into peacelords” in post-confl ict 
settings.24 The challenge here is not just to 
get IPS to lay down their arms after peace 
talks, but to transform their behavior even 
more profoundly so that they contribute to 
peacebuilding. In many cases, despite the 
cessation of hostilities, these actors continue 
to engage in coercion or veiled threats of 
violence and illicit economic activities that 
threaten democratic governance. International 
efforts to transform these actors have been 
limited, in part out of a fear of derailing the 
peace process; to the extent that they have 
occurred, they have been largely unsuccessful. 
Growing evidence of the many ways in which 
IPS undermine peacebuilding has led an 
increasing number of analysts to conclude:
if a sustainable peace is sought, rather 
than a simple shifting of conﬂ ict 
scenarios, legitimacy and recognition 
extended by the international 
community must be accompanied by 
accountability on the part of the armed 
groups. The question is, then, how do 
we accomplish that?25
This question is becoming increasingly 
relevant as the scope of humanitarian 
engagement broadens from NGOs 
negotiating safety corridors necessary for 
carrying out their missions to government 
development agencies exploring whether 
and when engagement with NSAGs might 
be advisable.26 Accordingly, workshop 
participants debated which kinds of 
IPS could be transformed; what mix of 
engagement and marginalization could effect 
the desired transformation; and the extent 
to which conditionality could be employed 
successfully in engagement strategies. 
This section reports on this discussion, 
reviewing each prism of the IPS framework 
to determine what leverage it offers 
to the policy maker or fi eld operator 
in determining whether and how to 
marginalize or transform IPS. 
A. Worldview
For some workshop participants, the 
classifi cation of an IPS as either reconcilable 
or absolutist provided clear policy choices. 
If the IPS is reconcilable to a democratic 
rule-based state, a peace process would 
seek to address its concerns through 
Participants used case 
studies to illuminate 
different approaches 
to mitigating IPS’ 
negative effects. 
personal security guarantees; limited or 
potential amnesty; military integration; 
DDR programs; participation in the 
political process; and community, local, 
and economic development. If the IPS is 
absolutist, interventions would aim to 
marginalize it through military action, law 
enforcement, psychological operations, 
exclusion from the political process, 
economic sanctions, and the strengthening 
of other actors.27 
Other participants, however, cautioned 
against employing only exclusionary 
strategies for dealing with IPS judged 
to be absolutist. After all, one possible 
outcome of an effort to weaken an 
absolutist IPS would be to motivate a 
change in worldview that would render it 
amenable to peace talks. With this in mind, 
interventions to weaken IPS and strategies 
of transformation may be complementary 
and should often be undertaken 
simultaneously. As one participant noted, 
British Government offi cials always kept 
the door open to the IRA behind the scenes, 
even during the tensest moments. 
All participants agreed that moving IPS 
along the spectrum from absolutist to 
reconcilable was a desirable goal and 
that the position of a given group should 
be constantly reevaluated to determine 
if interventions are working and/or if 
a change in policy is warranted, either 
because the approach is not working 
or success has changed the IPS and its 
objectives. Since worldview is understood 
as a composite of attitudes and behavior, 
moving IPS along the spectrum entails 
generating not just IPS’ rhetorical 
acceptance of peace and participation in 
politics but motivating behavior consistent 
with these norms. 
Most participants agreed that the 
prospects for engagement are most 
positive when it is undertaken with IPS 
who are closer to the reconcilable end of 
the spectrum.28 They differ, however, in 
where the line should be drawn: whether 
engagement is primarily an option for IPS 
who are ready for peace talks or whether it 
is also appropriate for actors closer to the 
absolutist end of the spectrum. 
Determining the prospects of success 
of a specifi c transformation strategy 
requires examining the elements of an IPS’ 
worldview that are relevant to both the 
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goal sought (e.g., respect for human rights, 
participation in peace talks, contributions 
to statebuilding) and the strategy chosen. 
For example, the success of “naming 
and shaming” approaches to encourage 
respect for human rights will depend in 
part upon IPS ideas about what constitutes 
legitimacy, how it must be obtained, 
and the importance of international 
reputation.29 Whether or not IPS should 
be permitted to be part of the government 
(as with warlords in Afghanistan), and 
on what terms, would depend upon their 
attitudes toward the central state and the 
rule of law, above and beyond their offi cial 
willingness to lay down arms.30 
It is critical that policymakers 
take advantage of the “ripe 
moment” created when a change 
of circumstances shocks a group 
into realizing that the prospect of 
victory is diminished.
Devising effective transformation strategies 
will depend, in part, upon understanding 
more about when and why IPS in the real 
world have moved along the spectrum from 
absolutist to reconcilable. Case studies 
presented at the workshop provided some 
insight into this process. For example, 
most analysts would place the LRA at the 
absolutist end of the spectrum, typifi ed by 
the messianic leadership of Joseph Kony 
and its relatively free rein in a depopulated 
Northern Uganda. However, the peace 
talks of 2007 had more success than ever 
before, in large part because the Sudanese 
government’s termination of aid and 
safe haven shook, at least temporarily, 
Kony’s belief that he had a real chance of 
overthrowing the Ugandan government.31 
Although Kony’s worldview and 
expectations of success are unfathomable 
to most observers, they are critical for 
understanding why the resource-targeting 
strategy had the success it did. Arguably, 
a messianic movement with continued 
freedom of movement in northern Uganda 
would have been much less affected by 
the loss of aid from a neighbor. Efforts 
to gain Kony’s trust through contact 
with his mother and other measures also 
contributed to a change in his worldview. 
This example demonstrates the importance 
for policymakers of taking advantage of the 
“ripe moment” created when a change of 
circumstances shocks a group into realizing 
that the prospect of victory is diminished. If 
not, the passage of time may give the group 
time to recover from the psychological 
shock and reduce the chances for peace, 
as may be happening now as the LRA 
substitutes operations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo for Sudanese 
assistance and safe haven. 
While a good deal is known about the 
process and circumstances which lead 
IPS to become amenable to peace talks, 
much less work has been done on what 
circumstances, if any, might generate the 
transformation of warlords to peacelords. 
Workshop participants stressed the need 
for creative thinking on this front. As Mark 
Sedra and others have noted in the case of 
Afghanistan, relying on bribes to garner 
the adherence of warlords to the central 
government, rather than imposing more 
stringent requirements as a condition for 
participation, has worked against such a 
transformation.32 An examination of the 
Afghanistan case also led participants to 
argue that greater consideration should be 
given to the circumstances under which IPS 
with illicit wealth might be transformed 
into legitimate businesses and the 
desirability of such an option.33 
B. Motivations
Workshop participants identifi ed a 
number of instances in which knowing the 
motivations of IPS members and/or leaders 
was important for devising responses: 
Peace Processes: Practitioners with 
experience in Africa highlighted the 
criticality of understanding the greed-based 
agendas of IPS leaders to shape successful 
peace talks. If control over illicit economic 
activities were simply a means to an end 
(i.e., a source of funding for the war effort), 
the issue would not need to be included on 
the peace agenda. However, when greed 
motivates the fi ght over resources, it must 
be included along with whatever grievance-
related issues are negotiated. 
DDR Programs: In some ways, DDR 
programs are unaffected by the motives 
of IPS; regardless of IPS motive, DDR 
programs must provide security guarantees 
for demobilizing combatants and address 
their livelihood concerns. The obstacles to 
this goal are greater, however, where IPS 
are engaged in illicit economic activities. If 
reintegration programs fall short of their 
mark, the IPS member can turn to the skills 
and contacts developed during participation 
in the illicit economy to earn a living. When 
IPS members are motivated by greed, the 
challenge of reintegration is even greater, 
as it is diffi cult for DDR programs to 
match the level of compensation and status 
achieved during the war years. 
Participants also stressed the utility of 
identifying the varying motives and interests 
of IPS leadership, mid-level commanders, 
and rank-and-fi le followers in order 
to tailor programs for each level that 
addressed their needs.34 The interests of the 
top leadership tend to be addressed during 
the peace process, with offers of exotic 
villas, control over resource ministries, 
or other political positions. At the same 
time, DDR programs seek to provide for 
the livelihood interests of the rank-and-
fi le, albeit not always successfully. Despite 
this objective, workshop participants 
highlighted the repeated failure of DDR 
programs to identify and target the 
special livelihood needs of middle-level 
commanders, whose demilitarization and 
economic reintegration may be the key to 
post-confl ict stability. These commanders 
often have the status and connections 
to either remobilize the rank-and-fi le or 
to forge (or in many cases to maintain) 
criminal networks. Reintegrating these 
individuals will be no easy task: given the 
level of status and power they attained 
in the IPS, their livelihood demands may 
be too high and offering them a political 
role may be undesirable, for reasons 
ranging from a lack of education to their 
implication in the worst war atrocities. 
Nonetheless, participants endorsed an 
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approach to DDR that more explicitly 
considers ways to meet these challenges.
Addressing Root Causes: The working 
group charged with devising responses to 
IPS based on this prism argued that:
identifying to what extent need, greed, 
and/or creed are driving the IPS allows 
one to respond to the underlying causes 
of the problem. While law enforcement 
is required for each category regardless 
of motivation, other interventions would 
address the speciﬁ c motivations:
 •  Where need is a motivation, 
interventions would aim to foster 
social well-being through improving 
public services, legal and regulatory 
frameworks, access to capital, and 
other underpinnings of economic 
development and opening up the 
political arena to competitive elections.  
•  Where creed is a motivation, 
interventions would focus on education 
in primary and secondary schools and 
information campaigns to promote 
tolerance and pro-state attitudes. 
•  Where greed is a motivation, 
interventions would create 
opportunities for people to compete 
and advance in licit channels 
by removing barriers to entry, 
subsidies, permit requirements, 
import restrictions, and the like 
in the economic realm and by 
opening up the political arena to 
competitive elections. Transparency 
and accountability measures would 
also be important responses to 
greed-motivated IPS located within 
the government or those actors who 
take advantage of the diversion of 
state resources. 35
Most participants agreed with this approach 
of exploring IPS motivations as a means 
to understand and address the structural 
factors motivating confl ict, although they 
might quibble with the particular measures 
chosen as remedies. Others, however, 
questioned the effectiveness of root 
cause approaches for combating already 
established groups. While combating the 
underlying problems motivating IPS may 
make sense at the pre-confl ict stage or 
when IPS are initially forming, participants 
wondered whether these measures would 
actually siphon off popular support for IPS, 
reduce the number of recruits, or otherwise 
weaken the organization. For example, 
Mr. Sasha Lezhnez of 
Global Witness presents 
a case study on the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Uganda.
measures targeting poverty might not be 
very pertinent for challenging a grievance-
based organization that forcibly recruits 
its members and does not rely heavily on 
popular support for its operation. 
In some cases, measures that might be 
appropriate to prevent the emergence 
of IPS may be counterproductive when 
undertaken where IPS already exist. To 
the extent that greed-based IPS often 
arise out of grievances rooted in rentier 
states, where signifi cant amounts of 
natural resource royalties (rents) accrue 
directly to the state and only a few are 
engaged in productive activities, the 
recommendations of the working group 
to liberalize the economy may make sense 
as a preventive measure. However, where 
IPS are present, economic liberalization 
and privatization undertaken without the 
appropriate safeguards and regulations 
serve only to entrench illicit wartime 
networks in the postwar economic and 
social system. Similarly, good governance 
reforms like decentralization, which 
is designed to address the “underlying 
causes” of unrest, may only serve to 
strengthen existing IPS. In Colombia, 
for example, decentralization helped 
enrich IPS by channeling signifi cant 
state resources (up to half the budget) 
to subnational governments which were 
particularly susceptible to IPS pressure.36 
C. Resources
Identifying the resources sustaining an IPS 
allows practitioners to craft responses to 
reduce or eliminate that source of funding. 
These efforts may range from military 
action and sanctions where a state is 
sponsoring the IPS to fi nancial and legal 
regulations pertaining to diaspora funding, 
industry certifi cation in the diamond and 
logging trade, anti-corruption measures, 
and eradication, alternative livelihood 
programs, and efforts to curtail demand 
in the case of drugs. Introducing increased 
transparency and accountability in 
government, particularly in the management 
of natural resources, would help reduce the 
diversion of state resources to IPS. Increasing 
transparency and setting standards in natural 
resource and other markets would help level 
the playing fi eld for licit economic actors and 
reduce the gains to those who use violence in 
the pursuit of economic gain. 
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actors develop effective 
strategies to transform 
or mitigate the negative 
effects of IPS, moving 
them along the spectrum of 
absolutist to reconcilable. 
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The effectiveness of these interventions has 
varied greatly, in part because of variations 
in the nature of the markets they attempt 
to regulate and in part because of the 
challenges of implementing sanctions. One 
of the most effective approaches has been 
the Kimberly Certifi cation process which 
was designed to limit the market for so-
called “blood diamonds;” the existence 
of a single buyer in the diamond market 
was a key factor in the relative success of 
this approach. In addition, the fact that 
diamonds are a legal product (as opposed 
to cocaine, for example) legitimates their 
inclusion on the peace agenda and provides 
incentives for IPS to negotiate peace in 
order to maintain their market share. In 
other cases, where markets are larger (such 
as trade in timber or the secondary market 
for oil) or illegal, regulation poses greater 
challenges. Self-monitoring by businesses 
in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative represents an advance, albeit with 
obvious challenges of implementation and 
enforcement that are rivaled only by the 
obstacles the United Nations faces in its 
implementation of sanctions regimes.37 
Although the targeted sanctions regimes 
used against IPS resources cause less 
humanitarian suffering than general 
sanctions, they often produce other 
unintended consequences. For example, 
these measures have often been criticized 
for either creating the smuggling 
opportunities that IPS can exploit (in the 
case of embargoes) or increasing the profi t 
to be earned from already illegal activities 
(such as drug traffi cking).38 
Even where a given intervention is effective 
in temporarily reducing the fl ow of one 
resource, the overall impact on IPS resources 
and the course of the confl ict is not always 
clear. Many IPS have diversifi ed portfolios 
of illicit economic activities and can easily 
replace the loss of one resource with another. 
(Though, as the earlier discussion of the 
LRA suggested, under certain conditions 
a sudden decline in resources may have a 
psychological impact on the IPS, creating a 
“ripe moment” for peace talks that will last 
until the IPS fi nds a substitute.) A reduction 
in resources may lead IPS to engage in even 
greater economic predation against civilians 
or to enter into competition with rival IPS 
over control of territory needed to carry 
out illicit economic activities, resulting in 
an increase in violence against civilians and 
internally displaced persons. 
Mr. Cliff Aims offers 
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past interventions. 
Although the literature on control 
regimes has little to say on the subject, 
the impact of a reduction in resources 
on the course of the confl ict may vary 
depending on the nature of the IPS 
affected. The cases of Sierra Leone and 
Angola suggest that reduced resources 
may bring groups to the peace table 
not because of the objective decline in 
power, but rather because of the fallout 
it created within the group, reducing its 
coherence. Similarly, IPS motivated by 
greed may be more pragmatic in the face 
of threats to their livelihood and hence 
more willing to negotiate their continued 
access to resources in a peace treaty 
than ideologues who remain committed 
to their cause and see the decline in 
resources as only a temporary setback. 
Finally, efforts to combat illicit economic 
activities or to target fi nancial fl ows 
from the diaspora will inevitably affect 
segments of the population other than 
the IPS. The extent to which this process 
favors or undermines IPS will depend 
upon their broader relationship with the 
population, an issue which is addressed 
more fully in the next section. 
D. Relationships
Understanding the ties that bind IPS to 
religious, linguistic, ethnic, political, economic, 
and diaspora groups allows one to determine 
whether and how to break these links. While 
the resources prism includes a focus on the 
material resources that groups provide to 
the IPS, this prism takes a broader look at 
different kinds of support groups lend to IPS 
and the infl uence they might exercise over 
them. It also emphasizes the importance of 
understanding what the IPS provides to these 
groups as a means of understanding IPS 
persistence and identifying the possibilities 
for transformation or marginalization of 
the groups. 
Workshop participants noted that while 
IPS can often be abusive toward local 
populations, in many cases they also 
provide important services such as the 
maintenance of order or delivery of social 
programs. An overemphasis on the illicit 
behavior of IPS can overshadow factors 
that may make the groups legitimate 
with key constituents; the resulting 
policy will not only fail to break these 
ties but may even strengthen them. For 
example, eradication programs have been 
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blamed for, at worst, driving growers 
of illicit crops into the arms of IPS and, 
at best, being ineffective by failing to 
address the relationships within which 
the illicit activity is embedded (e.g., the 
“coercive credit system controlled by local 
strongmen” in the case of opium poppy 
in Afghanistan).39 Participants strongly 
advocated using needs assessments to 
inform the development of programs 
to help the population and thus reduce 
support for IPS.
Finally, participants stressed the value of 
understanding the relationship between 
IPS and the population in order to devise 
effective DDR programs. Determining 
whether home communities would accept 
IPS members back into the fold, and under 
what conditions, are important fi rst steps for 
any program; in cases where communities 
are receptive, creative campaigns publicizing 
these efforts could encourage important 
individual defections or form the basis for 
the demobilization of groups. 
More generally, the terms and outcome of 
most engagement strategies will depend 
in part on the population’s views of the 
IPS. In Uganda, for example, the internally 
displaced persons most affected by the LRA 
preferred peace to an international criminal 
court trial for Kony, whereas in Colombia, 
key segments of the population rejected 
the possibility of paramilitary participation 
in politics as part of the DDR agreement. 
Some workshop participants noted that the 
international community has sometimes 
failed to distinguish between armed groups 
that preyed on civilians and those with ties 
to communities who may have engaged in 
human rights violations in defense of the local 
populations. Arguably the latter category 
would be more appropriate candidates for 
transformation than the former.
Although much of the workshop discussion 
focused on IPS relationships with the 
population, this prism also offers insights 
into how other key relationships affect 
points of entry for transformation or 
marginalization of IPS. For example, in the 
past, states and the international community 
have sometimes found that they have better 
access to, and more points of leverage over, 
external state sponsors and diaspora groups 
than IPS themselves. On the other hand, IPS 
ties to politicians and the state apparatus 
reduce the leverage of the international 
community, explaining the frequent lack of 
At left: Participants discussed whether the trilogy of “need, creed, and greed” 
sufﬁ ced to describe IPS motivations.
Pictured at right: Mr. Diego Bustamante, Integral Action Coordination Center 
of the Presidential Ofﬁ ce, Government of Colombia and Lieutenant Colonel 
Apollinaire Ndayimirije. 
political will within host countries to tackle 
IPS within many countries.
E. Structure 
Workshop participants discussed ways 
in which understanding the internal 
organization of IPS can be important 
for both strategies of marginalization 
and engagement. Law enforcement and 
military agencies have long scrutinized IPS 
structures in order to target “critical nodes” 
in a network, such as bomb makers or 
fi nancial offi cers, or to target the group’s 
leadership as a means of “decapitating” 
the organization. The latter approach has 
had some notable successes, primarily in 
cases of NSAGs where leadership is highly 
personalized and centralized, as was the 
case with the Shining Path in Peru under 
Anibal Guzman. But, for the most part, 
NSAGs tend to be governed by committee 
and/or operate with some decentralized 
autonomy, a structure that allows them to 
survive the assassination or capture of top 
leaders (e.g., the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front in El Salvador, the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka). 
Against criminal groups, in contrast, 
“kingpin” strategies have been more 
successful in leading to the fragmentation 
and decentralization of hierarchical 
organizations, as was the case with the 
Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia. 
These strategies were successful in 
reducing the direct challenge to the 
state posed by cartels — the terrorist 
violence employed by Medellin cartel 
leader Pablo Escobar and the high-level 
corruption typical of the Cali cartel 
— but were less successful in reducing 
drug traffi cking. They also highlight 
the potential unintended consequences 
of efforts to target organizations 
without addressing the illicit activity 
that sustains them. The weakening and 
fragmentation of the main cartels in 
Colombia created a vacuum which the 
FARC and paramilitaries could exploit; 
increased involvement in the drug trade 
augmented the resources available to 
these IPS and competition between the 
groups for control of the trade led to an 
escalation of violence against the rural 
population. Overall, the case illustrates 
the importance of considering the impact 
that successfully targeting an organization 
will have on the illicit activity of concern 
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the effect of IPS on 
S&R activities.
(e.g., the drug trade, levels of violence, 
corruption) and on power relationships 
among IPS. 
Understanding organizational structure can 
also be a vital tool for devising engagement 
strategies, ranging from human rights 
accords to peace talks to DDR programs. 
For example, it is important to know 
whether a group has a command and 
control structure that permits the leadership 
to bring their followers along in any peace 
accords or human rights convention to 
which the leaders might consent. The level 
of internal pluralism also is an important 
variable for outsiders to monitor, since 
it shapes the effectiveness of engagement 
strategies that purport to favor more 
moderate factions within the organization. 
When there is little diversity in worldviews 
within an organization, as is likely the case 
with the Tamil Tigers, engagement may not 
favor moderates, as is typically argued; 
instead, negotiations may serve only to 
strengthen hardliners vis-à-vis moderates 
in the broader, but excluded, Tamil 
community.40 
Finally, workshop participants stressed 
the importance of understanding internal 
organizations, particularly relationships 
between leaders and followers, for devising 
effective DDR programs. In Afghanistan, 
for example, the failure to understand 
the patron-client networks within armed 
groups resulted in DDR programs 
that not only did little to disarticulate 
militias, by failing to address the mid-
level commanders who were the key to 
mobilization of the rank and fi le, but even 
strengthened the leadership of the groups, 
by providing cash compensation for 
weapons which the rank-and-fi le turned 
over to their patrons.••
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Workshop participants developed recommendations to help actors enhance 
their understanding of IPS and improve the effectiveness of policy interventions. 
In addition, they suggested areas for additional research and analysis. 
Recommendations
Ongoing efforts to analyze IPS and devise 
responses to address them should take into 
account the following recommendations: 
•  Beyond war and peace: Much of 
practitioners’ work on IPS and confl ict 
has focused on either defeating non-
state armed groups or encouraging their 
participation in peace processes.41 Future 
work should build on and systematize 
the fi ndings of the confl ict resolution 
and mediation literature, but also go 
beyond this work to consider whether 
and how IPS should be engaged outside 
of a peace process (that is, both before 
and after the peace). Recent work has 
explored the challenges of promoting 
respect for human rights among NSAGs42 
and how development agencies might 
interact with such groups. Future work 
would benefi t from exploring the costs 
and benefi ts of marginalizing or engaging 
IPS during post-confl ict peacebuilding. 
One key challenge of addressing IPS 
during peacetime is the need to address 
their links to political and state actors. In 
addition, policymakers in a wide array 
of fi elds, from security sector reform to 
economic development, need to 
consider the extent to which IPS 
affect their goals and then tailor their 
programs appropriately. 
•  Beyond armed groups: The broad 
defi nition of IPS employed in the 
framework highlights the threats posed 
to peacebuilding by actors engaged 
in criminal activities, many of whom 
occupy, or have ties to those who 
occupy, state or political positions. 
Whatever their provenance, whether 
common criminals, ex-combatants 
turned criminals, or warlords who 
failed the transition to peacelords, 
these “governance spoilers” can 
threaten the peace as much as NSAGs. 
Correspondingly, much of the discussion 
at the workshop centered on the political 
economy of DDR and the challenges 
of transforming illicit economies that 
formed during confl ict. Understanding 
the varying interests of rank-and-fi le, 
mid-level commanders, and the top 
leadership; the linkages between the 
levels; and the relationships between 
these individuals and the communities 
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into which they would be reintegrated 
are all essential for a DDR program that 
will help prevent both a return to arms 
and a turn to crime. 
Similarly, workshop participants argued 
that actors needed to develop creative 
approaches to transform post-confl ict 
economies. At the very least, promoters 
of economic development need to take 
into account that their policies are not 
being implemented on a clean slate 
but rather face the likelihood of being 
hijacked by existing local and national-
level elites (which, in many cases, are 
IPS). Efforts to transform the economy 
might even include programs to make 
IPS licit (turning “robber barons” into 
entrepreneurs); such an approach would 
require a careful mix of sticks and 
carrots to generate a change in behavior 
among these actors in return for their 
acceptance as legitimate businessmen. 
Overall, more work is needed on ways 
to promote economic development 
without strengthening those who 
continue to engage in violence and other 
illicit activities. 
•  Beyond sticks: Labeling groups as IPS 
should not predispose policymakers 
to rely on law enforcement as a 
single default response. Workshop 
participants were quick to stress that 
“coercive” approaches need to be 
complemented by positive incentives. 
For example, while eradication may be 
a necessary part of any drug control 
program, it must be accompanied by 
programs that address the needs of the 
growers of illicit crops and recognize 
the power relationships at the local 
level (between IPS and growers) that 
drive illicit crop production. At the 
same time, advocates of alternative 
development should acknowledge that 
growers need to have strong incentives 
to abandon the benefi ts that illicit crop 
cultivation brings and law enforcement 
is important for providing that impetus. 
•  Beyond analysis: Practitioners’ analyses 
are of little consequence if insights are not 
converted into programs and action. The 
workshop discussion revealed a number of 
different paths to action that can be pursued 
simultaneously. These paths include:
Mr. Michael Miklaucic 
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on the Communist 
Party of Nepal.
   Mapping programs to challenges: 
Practitioners who are taking a fi rst cut 
at devising a response should review the 
challenges identifi ed in the framework 
and map existing programs, or craft 
new ones, to meet these challenges. For 
example, if IPS are fulfi lling the needs 
of certain sectors of the population, 
practitioners should conduct a needs 
assessment and implement programs that 
enable the government or international 
community can supplant those ties. 
Where IPS exist, the rule of law is clearly 
missing and programs to reform the police 
and judiciary are appropriate, as are 
programs targeting the sources of funding 
for IPS. This is the meat-and-potatoes of 
policymaking and is refl ected in many of 
the participant recommendations discussed 
in the body of this report. Implicit in these 
recommendations are judgments about 
which policies will be effective, but at 
times these judgments are based more on 
logic than actual lessons learned. Given 
this bias, case studies that identify lessons 
learned both through cross-country case 
studies and single country studies can serve 
as informative guides. 
   The need for case studies: A study of 
the effectiveness of a single intervention 
(e.g., targeted sanctions) across a number 
of cases provides useful guidelines for 
policymakers. Given the focus of this 
framework, such a comparison should pay 
attention to whether the success or failure 
of the initiative is linked to the nature of 
the IPS, among other factors. Workshop 
participants, for example, noted that the 
“kingpin strategy” targeting the leadership 
of the IPS is most effective against groups 
with a highly centralized and personalized 
leadership. Studies of a single IPS in a 
given country should address the same 
issues, but would also provide special 
insight into the evolution of the IPS over 
time. Are there particular points in the 
development of an IPS when it is most 
vulnerable?43 What factors account for 
changes in the behavior or strength of 
an IPS and what “points of entry” for 
policymakers can be gleaned from this? 
 Both types of case studies could provide 
insights into how the existence of IPS 
affects the formulation, implementation, 
and outcome of policies. The comparative 
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approach might compare a single policy 
across cases (e.g., how the introduction 
of elections, or privatization, or 
decentralization is shaped by the presence 
of IPS). The single-case approach could 
consider the ways in which an IPS in a 
given country affects the implementation 
of a whole range of government or 
international community initiatives, from 
security sector reform to decentralization 
to development. In both types of case 
studies, particular attention should be 
paid to the unintended consequences 
of interventions.
•  Sharing perspectives across communities: 
Finally, workshop participants stressed the 
need for a “whole government” approach 
to assessing IPS and devising responses. A 
myriad of actors, ranging from the military 
to law enforcement to anti-corruption 
specialists to development agencies, 
have a stake in addressing IPS but are 
unaccustomed to communicating with one 
another. One goal of the workshop was to 
contribute to cross-community learning 
and the development of professional 
networks among participants to facilitate 
collective problem-solving and to equip 
individuals to be change agents within their 
own communities. Workshop participants 
developed plans to continue refi ning the 
IPS framework and to explore the creation 
of cross-community assessment teams. 
In so doing, they acknowledged that 
different agencies and communities, with 
their emphasis on different intermediate 
goals and their varying expertise, bring 
complementary and sometimes competing 
perspectives to the table on the challenges 
posed by IPS and the necessary responses 
to them. These views need to be captured 
both during the strategic planning and 
operational phases.••
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  1  Corruption in post-conflict 
settings was a focus of 
Transparency International’s 
2005 annual report. In addition, 
workshops on the topic were 
held by CSRS in December 2006, 
Oxford University in March 
2007, and the Fletcher School 
at Tufts University in April of 
2007. USAID inaugurated its 
project on IPS in 2006 and held 
a series of conferences on the 
framework in 2007.
  2  This last criterion is somewhat 
vague and would benefit from 
greater specification, depending 
on the goals of the organizations 
using the framework. For 
example, a development agency 
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